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The key role of capital accumulation in economic development
has been almost a truism in economics since the classical econo-
mists (Smith,Ricardo,Marx). Investmentwas oneof the obvious
ways to promote economic growth in their theories as well as in
the “modern” growth models (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer, &
Weil, 1992; Solow, 1956), and the speciﬁc circumstances of
underdeveloped economies in this regard have been extensively
explored since development economics became a recognizable
sub-discipline (see, e.g., Hirschman, 1958; Rostow, 1960; and
various contributions in Meier & Seers, 1984).
In recent years, institutions have becomemore prominent in the
scholarly literature, among the factors that could determine
growth and investment performance, (North, 1990; Rodrik,
2000; Shirley, 2008). The literature has identiﬁed a host of growth
and investment-relevant institutions, and their direct or indirect
channels of inﬂuence. This has led, among others, to the “business
environment” and “investment climate” approaches to institu-
tional reforms for growth and poverty reduction (see, e.g.,
OECD, 2004). Salient among the key institutions are those that
protect investors from expropriation and those that determine
how contracts are enforced. Though these two classes of institu-
tions may overlap, they are not conceptually identical, and we will
argue (as have done; e.g., Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005) that it is
analytically desirable to try to disentangle their speciﬁc eﬀects.
This article weighs the empirical evidence on one speciﬁc
link between institutions and economic performance. In par-
ticular, we undertake a Systematic Review (SR) on the connec-
tion between contract enforcement and investment.
(a) Contract enforcement
Various economic historians, including North (1990), have
argued that the enforcement of contracts became more
involved and consequential with increased specialization,322larger numbers of trading partners, and geographic disloca-
tion of transactions. With complex contracts it became neces-
sary to devise some form of third-party enforcement. In fact,
in modern societies, the three forms of exchanges and enforce-
ment arrangements (tacit, explicit-informal, and formal) co-
exist, and even archaic and seemingly dysfunctional informal
rules can have major impacts. The diﬀerent behavioral out-
comes in countries with similar legislation are a conﬁrmation
that informal rules can be powerful (Berkowitz, Pistor, &
Richard, 2003).
These historical and theoretical issues are still debated
between those that take the view that formal enforcement
mechanisms (and contract law) are essential for development
and those that believe that informal enforcement mechanisms
(and contract arrangements) could be suﬃcient (North, 1990;
Greif, 2006). In the middle, some advance the idea that
diﬀerent enforcement arrangements can work well at diﬀerent
levels of development and/or for diﬀerent country contexts.
The “varieties of capitalism” literature maintains that liberal
economies rely more on standard market relationships and
enforceable formal contracts than coordinated market
economies, where dense business networks and associations
disseminate reputations allowing ﬁrms to operate on the basis
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communalist societies resort more to intra-group sanctions,
meanwhile individualist societies rely more on formal contract
enforcement (Greif, 2005, chap. 28). Trebilcock and Leng
(2006) favor stages of development argument: for low levels
of economic development informal contract enforcement
may be a good substitute for formal enforcement, but for
higher levels of development formal contract law and enforce-
ment are necessary.
The coexistence of formal contracts and informal (frequently
tacit) arrangements is also highlighted by Macaulay (1963),
who investigates when and why managers decide to formally
enforce a contract, and the reasons why third-party enforce-
ment is not invoked more often when the letter of a contract
would favor the claimant. He concludes that “businessmen
often fail to plan exchange relationships completely, and sel-
dom use legal sanctions to adjust these relationships or to settle
disputes” (p. 55). This implies that also individualist, liberal,
and developed economies use informal contracts and enforce-
ment arrangements much more extensively than generally
assumed in the law and economics and institutionalist litera-
tures. This line of reasoning would conclude that what matters
for development is the existence of some enforcement capacities
rather than speciﬁc formal laws and enforcement mechanisms.
Regarding the actors of the enforcement process, in contem-
porary societies, enforcement can come from societal sanc-
tions, from second-party retaliation or from a coercive third
party (typically, the state). Given the diversity of contracts,
legal traditions, codes, and informal institutions, there is a
range of possible innovations that may directly or indirectly
impact on the enforcement of contracts. Typically, donor-
funded reform programs, for example, tend to tackle simulta-
neously a number of perceived gaps in the written laws and the
functioning of the judiciary (for example, ﬁxing loopholes in
commercial or civil legislation, creating non-judicial arbitra-
tion mechanisms, facilitating access to the judicial system,
reducing costs of litigation, strengthening the capacities of
the courts and judges). All of them have some bearing on
the speed and eﬀectiveness of contract enforcement, and more
broadly on “the rule of law” (see, e.g., World Bank, 2001), but
they focus on formal institutions and assume that the rule-
enforcement distinction is unproblematic.
(b) Contract enforcement and investment
This article focuses on a relatively narrow, yet fundamental
“corner” of the broader “institutions and economic perfor-
mance” literature. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of
the ﬁeld. In the top block, research strands are organized
according to the nature of the institutions that might impact
on economic performance. Political institutions that set the
rules about who governs and how (investigated among others
by Alberto Alesina, Thorsten Persson,and Barry Weingast),
and legal rules excluding those that allocate political power
(i.e., what is most often understood to be “the Law” in “Law
and Economics”) are represented as the complements of
informal economic institutions (investigated, for example, by
Sam Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Pranab Bardham, and others).
For our purposes it is useful to distinguish within the Law
and Economics space a sector that gathers works on the eﬀects
and determinants of unilateral state regulations (studied, e.g.,
by Peter Klein and Pablo Spiller, among others), and which is
distinct from the research on institutions that support volun-
tary dyadic exchanges (exempliﬁed by writings by Benito
Arrun˜ada, Katharina Pistor or Holger Spamann, but also by
Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine. 1Theoretical and empirical works can be thought to cluster
around some of the (causal) connections between “institu-
tions” from the Figure’s top block and economic outcomes
from the bottom area. The similarity between the labels that
would result and the sections and chapters of a comprehensive
handbook such as Menard and Shirley (2005) suggest the dia-
gram is a reasonable representation of the relevant research
ﬁelds. In that framework, work on “contract enforcement”
and investment occupies a narrow but fundamental space,
encompassing formal and informal contracts and enforcement
mechanisms (the ﬁgure has to be interpreted as covering also
studies that would challenge the simpler formal-informal
dichotomy, such as Macaulay’s, or that highlights the incom-
pleteness of the Law and the ensuing ambiguities of enforce-
ment; Pistor & Xu, 2003). The rationale for the restrictive
deﬁnition of our focus is discussed below but we can say in
advance that it is best suited to undertaking a thorough
appraisal of the evidence in support of an inﬂuential hypothe-
sis.
The diagram reﬂects that research on the link between con-
tract enforcement and investment is a cross-cutting sector of
the complementary ﬁelds of Law and Economics and the study
of economic consequences of informal institutions. As
deﬁned in this article, the ﬁeld of unilateral regulations by
governments does not intersect with our object of analysis;
nor does the ﬁeld of political institutions and economic
outcomes).
Analytically, weak enforcement of contracts has been
argued to impact on investment through a number of chan-
nels. First, it could most directly inﬂuence the uncertainty sur-
rounding a project, and therefore inﬂuence investors’ decisions
by increasing the project’s costs, reducing its expected returns,
causing both, or generally increasing the value of the “wait”
option (Dixit & Pyndick, 1994).
Second, weak enforcement could act indirectly on agents’
willingness or ability to invest: it could induce them to choose
less-eﬃcient technologies, inhibit them from building
relation-speciﬁc assets when those relations are dependent on
contracts, or amplify the adverse eﬀects of infrastructure or
regulatory shortcomings. All these could in turn aﬀect a ﬁrm’s
access to external ﬁnancing, while capital markets and the
banking industry might be more generally crippled by an envi-
ronment of insecure contracts. These various channels and
some others may combine in complex ways. For example,
some authors have found analytical support for the idea that
weak enforceability increases ﬁrms’ “sensitivity to the arrival
of new technologies and generates greater macroeconomic vol-
atility” (Cooley, Marimon, & Quadrini, 2004). To the extent
that aggregate (output) volatility inﬂuences investment, there
would be a causal chain from enforcement of contracts to
capital accumulation. Others have argued that, through
ﬁnancial contracts, imperfect enforcement inﬂuences the size
distribution and heterogeneity of ﬁrms, which could be
reﬂected in aggregate investment levels (Monge-Naranjo,
2009).
(c) Empirical approaches
Research on the eﬀects of institutions on economic perfor-
mance has grown very rapidly since the early 1990s. Theoret-
ical developments such as North’s contributions have
prompted the search for and elaboration of indicators and
proxies for the introduction of institutional variables in empir-
ical (usually econometric) analyses (see, e.g., Knack & Keefer,
1995; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005). The prolifera-
tion of datasets that include such indicators have stimulated
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Figure 1. Contract enforcement and investment in a map of relevant literatures.
324 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe empirical investigation of a range of research questions,
but also some “data-driven” research that has not shed much
light on the speciﬁc causal pathways that link institutions and
economic outcomes (on the latter, see similar observations by
Aaron, 2000; Keefer, 2004; Williams & Siddique, 2008).
With some noteworthy exceptions, the empirical literature
normally examines recorded variations in certain institu-
tional arrangements that may or may not follow from delib-
erate reforms. This state of the ﬁeld results from key
features of the object of analysis. Principles of territoriality
of the law and equality of all citizens before the Law, in
addition to the typical complexity of legal reforms, make
this an inhospitable territory for randomized controlled tri-
als or other quasi-experimental strategies requiring control
groups. In the best scenarios, diachronic variations are
exploited in search of some support for causal hypotheses.
In some cases, “recall” indicators in cross-section surveys
of key informants are the best data available to attempt
to detect a causal link.
The closest to the experimental ideal are exploitations of
natural experiments. With observational evidence dominating
the research ﬁeld, instrumental variables methods are the other
strategy to deal with potential endogeneity issues and provide
some support for causal inference. The broader weaknesses of
much of the evidence (including issues of validity of indicators
and broader empirical strategy), and the need to explore new
research designs, have been noted by several authors (Bazzi
& Clemens, 2013; Pande & Udry, 2006, chap. 14; Rodrik,
2005; Rehme, 2011; Shirley, 2008).
(d) Systematic reviews
To our knowledge, no systematic assessment of the research
on the topic has been conducted until now. To start ﬁlling this
void, we undertake a SR of the empirical work on contract
enforcement and investment. SRs are a meta-research method-
ology for the identiﬁcation, treatment, and synthesis of pri-
mary studies addressing an empirical question. 2 They
originate (like Meta-Analysis or MA) in the eﬀorts to improve
the use of research in policy-making and practice. 3 SRs diﬀerfrom other reviews in that they attempt to be exhaustive, rep-
licable, and bias-free. 4 They typically cover published and
unpublished studies, seeking to avoid some known sources
of bias, including publication bias (Egger, Ju¨ni, Bartlett,
Holenstein, & Sterne, 2003; Petticrew and Roberts, 2006,
chap. 1). SRs are especially well suited to getting a sense of
the weight (quantitative and qualitative) of the evidence sup-
porting empirical claims. Undertaking one of this kind of
assessments on a key empirical question is the main contribu-
tion of this article. 5
As it is the norm for systematic reviews, we developed a pro-
tocol that stipulated inclusion and exclusion criteria, methods
for identiﬁcation of primary studies, data extraction, quality
assessment, and synthesis, all based on accepted practice in
the literature on research synthesis (see Petticrew & Roberts,
2006; the peer-reviewed protocol is Aboal, D., Noya, N., &
Rius, 2010, available on request). The protocol was peer
reviewed by experts hired by the project funder, the United
Kingdom’s Department of International Development
(DFID).
The studies reviewed here yield estimates of quantitative
eﬀects of variation in the quality of contract enforcement on
investment, based on observational data of a cross-section,
panel, or longitudinal structure. The review does not take it
for granted that investment strictly causes growth (though it
is justiﬁed, to some degree, by the assumption that facilitating
investment will beneﬁt the growth process). 6 Moreover, the
review does not examine all the linkages from quality of insti-
tutions to investment (e.g., we do not examine studies on qual-
ity of property rights institutions more broadly deﬁned, such
as a political system of checks and balances or international
investment agreements, etc.).
(e) Rationale
Besides shedding light on a substantively important set of
theoretical hypotheses, the rationale for the review rests
particularly on the fact that donors and governments do
allocate ﬁnancial, human, and political resources to improving
the business environment, and in particular to trying to
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statement of the Independent Panel (2013) reviewing the
World Bank (WB) Group’s Doing Business report “[t]he Bank
has advised over 80 countries on reforms to regulations
measured in the report.” 7 The 2012 issue World Bank
(2012) mentions that the reports of the period 2005–12 have
recorded at least 114 reforms of courts related to commercial
dispute resolution, and 23 economies that introduced or
expanded specialized commercial courts with the objective of
improving the enforcement of contracts. The WB monitoring
indicators on contract enforcement are one of the most
frequently used in the institutions-performance literature,
revealing the close relations between policy and research in
this area.
The WB is not the only institution promoting these reforms
although it has had a leading role. Other backers include the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the
UK’s DFID, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooper-
ation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). They have supported or encouraged
“rule of law” programs in diﬀerent countries. To illustrate
their importance and expected results, consider the case of
Rwanda. The country has been reforming its commercial laws
and institutions since 2001, supported by the World Bank. It
was named the top reformer in Doing Business 2010, for pass-
ing a number of legal reforms that largely amount to the
importation of American-style code of contract based on com-
mon law. In another example, USAID established a three year
“Contract Law Enforcement Program” in Kosovo in 2013,
with the objective of “assisting Kosovo institutions to improve
the enforcement of civil judgments while dramatically reduc-
ing the backlog of enforcement cases in the Kosovo court sys-
tem, and . . . assisting Kosovo in developing and strengthening
its contract and commercial law framework and systems,
including mediation.” 8
While some of these eﬀorts could be justiﬁed simply on nor-
mative arguments about the development signiﬁcance of the
rule of law, the underlying assumption for many of those
reform eﬀorts is that investments will be unleashed by them.
Therefore, analyzing systematically the strength of the evi-
dence in favor of the latter assumption may eventually help
in deciding whether, how, and how much to invest in support-
ing reforms of that type.
In the next section we describe the methodology of the SR.
The Findings section follows and it has four parts: descriptive
synthesis; quality-weighted synthesis; contexts, mechanisms
and outcomes, and general issues. The ﬁnal section concludes.2. METHODS
We searched for primary studies in the pre-speciﬁed
sources, identifying those of interest on the basis of prede-
termined inclusion and exclusion criteria (the issues and
solutions discussed in this section are more extensively dealt
with in Aboal, D., Noya, N., & Rius, 2012). Those criteria
set boundaries to the review regarding eligible types of study
designs, deﬁnitions of contracts and enforcement, measured
outcomes (i.e., deﬁnition of “investment”), tested enforce-
ment-investment link, accessibility, historical scope, and
publication date.
In general, the methods applied are well-established in the
research synthesis ﬁeld and have been designed to avoid
or minimize risks of bias (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006,
pp. 232–236 is the source for this paragraph). Mitigation of“publication bias,” for example, is one of the purposes of
including unpublished work. As understood in the research
synthesis ﬁeld, “publication bias” refers to the tendency of
journal editors and researchers to suppress “non-signiﬁcant”
results on the basis of their supposed lack of editorial interest.
The inclusion of gray literature can reduce such bias and is
normally complemented with other protocol provisions to
protect reviews from avoidable bias. For example, SRs strive
to assess studies in their own technical merit and do not pay
attention to external information about the authors or spon-
sors that do not strictly reﬂect technical merit of the study. 9
We chose to limit the review to studies that empirically
address the link or a causal chain from (changes in some indi-
cators of) contract enforcement to (some customary measure
of) investment. The demarcation criteria resulted from both
conceptual and practical considerations. First, the existence
of a relationship between contract enforcement and invest-
ment is often assumed and it has important policy implica-
tions, but the strength of its empirical backing was
unknown. If institutions of contract enforcement are going
to have any impact on growth, the “investment channel” is
going to have some role in almost any economic explanation.
The strength of the evidence on the link would determine the
soundness of a lot of policy advice being oﬀered and the per-
tinence of related research agendas.
Second, we were aware that various institutions (besides
those regulating contract enforcement) had been linked in
the literature to the growth process, and in particular those
that relate to protections against expropriation. Our work’s
focus on a speciﬁc segment of the institutions-development
ﬁeld was not meant to neglect those other factors but to deﬁne
a tractable object of analysis. We hope that our contribution
could then be followed by reviews of other institutional
arrangements, seeking integration in a broader framework
over time. 10
On these bases, we did not set an exclusion criterion for
studies that seek evidence for involved causal pathways, pro-
vided that the whole causal chain that answers our question
(i.e., from enforcement mechanisms to investment) was empir-
ically tested. This approach is a response to studies that exam-
ine some shorter causal chain (for example, from contract
enforcement to ﬁnancial depth) and draw conclusions on the
eﬀects of institutions on investment without providing the evi-
dence of a link (for the same population) from ﬁnancial depth
to investment. Similarly, we excluded studies that focus on
other downstream outcomes such as growth, and include mea-
sures of contract enforcement among the explanatory vari-
ables, but do not test speciﬁcally an enforcement-investment
channel.
We searched four academic bibliographic databases (Aca-
demic Search Complete, Scopus, Jstor, and Econlit), a major
working papers repository (RepEc), and an online academic
citation tool (CiteULike).We made extensive use of Google
Scholar, and its integration with the professional databases
available to the local scientiﬁc community through the
National Innovation and Research Agency.
Searches started with broad parameters derived from our
research question and inclusion/exclusion criteria, and were
developed with the advice of our information specialist. These
searches were gradually narrowed with guidance from three
external reviewers contacted by DFID, including one
information specialist. All searches were stored to ensure rep-
licability. Two reviewers applied the inclusion and exclusion
criteria independently, ﬁrst to titles and abstracts only, for
all items identiﬁed by the database searches (initial number:
2,229).
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vant references from the bibliography sections of key pieces
in the thematic ﬁeld, and later in those studies’ bibliographies,
and so on. Overall, the snowballing search led to the identiﬁ-
cation of an additional 317, non-duplicated, potentially rele-
vant studies (12% of the total studies screened), and 8 (35%)
of the ﬁnal 22 studies included in this systematic review. We
scanned titles and checked abstracts for two hundred of the
most recent entries (as of 1st of March 2011) in the New
Institutional Economics e-library of the Social Sciences
Research Network (SSRN; www.ssrn.org), which yielded no
new relevant items.
Studies were then either (i) excluded from further consider-
ation, (ii) included in the set of those moving to the next stage,
or (iii) marked as “pending” if the reviewer was unsure about
their inclusion. The two independent reviews were compared
and diﬀerences in assessments were discussed and resolved
(when no agreement was reached, a third reviewer was asked
to enter the discussion until the disagreement was resolved
or there was a vote). All the “pending” were resolved and all
the “included” were then moved to the full text review phase,
where a similar procedure was applied.
Figure 2 summarizes the number of studies dealt with at
each stage of the search and screening process.
From the systematic search and screening, 22 primary
sources were identiﬁed that met the eligibility criteria. These
include two sets of items that contained diﬀerent reports or
versions of reports from members of a single team. We count
each set as one study, for quantitative description, and in the
rest of the analysis we include the best or more recent version,
as it is common practice in SRs. 11 This brings the total
number of “synthesized items” to 19.
We critically assessed the methodological quality of studies
included in our ﬁnal set before entering them into the synthesisItems analysed 
= 2546
Items from 
D-base searches
= 2229
Items from 
snowballing
= 317
Included for 
Full Text screening
= 114
Included for 
Full Text screening
= 61
Included for 
data extraction & 
synthesis
= 14
Included for 
data extraction & 
synthesis
= 8
Examined &
synthesised
= 22
Figure 2. Search and screening statistics.process. We applied two instruments from the literature to
capture diﬀerent aspects of study quality. The “Weight of Evi-
dence” instrument (WoE) was developed by Gough (2007) and
is designed to allow rating studies in four dimensions: quality
of study execution, research design (with Randomized
Controlled Trials as the golden standard and other ratings
decreasing from there), focus of the study, and overall quality
(a synthetic measure of the previous). The resulting rating is
transformed into a ﬁve-point scale of quality (low, medium–
low, medium, medium–high and high). The second instrument
(CI, for “causal inference”) seeks to capture the strength of
claims of a causal explanation on the basis of the study’s
design and execution. This allows the reviewers to distinguish
stronger and weaker studies among non-experimental ones. A
global rating was given to each study, which responds to the
question “Can the study deliver inferences about the causal
mechanisms at work?”; and the answer was coded at three
levels (Yes = 3; Yes, some = 2, or No = 1). The use of this
instrument is justiﬁed by the intent of the review, which clearly
sought to answer an “eﬀect” question in a ﬁeld where the norm
is observational. These quality ratings provide us with
synthetic quality indicators, and to use them to qualify speciﬁc
ﬁndings. 12
Our review follows standard systematic review procedures
and adopts an approach to synthesis that combines narrative
synthesis with “quality-adjusted vote counting” (Gough,
Oliver, & Thomas, 2012; Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). To some
extent, the synthesis follows the “realist” approach, regarding
the attention paid to patterns of context-mechanism-outcome
(CMOs; Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, & Walshe, 2004). This
means that we are not only interested in discerning whether
changes in the enforcement of contracts have been followed
by increases in investment, but also in the mechanisms that
might cause changes in enforceability to inﬂuence agents’
investment decisions and thus induce changes in aggregate
investment levels.
MAs, in turn, require a minimum number of estimations of
an empirical parameter, from a “population” of studies suﬃ-
ciently homogeneous to justify the quantitative synthesis. Typ-
ically, MA collects “eﬀect size” estimates from primary studies
(or the eﬀect regression parameter when applicable) and com-
putes statistical estimates that summarize the evidence. While
MAs can handle diverse samples, model speciﬁcations, estima-
tion methods, and even institutional context of the speciﬁc
studies (i.e., whether sponsored by an interested party or an
independent funder), a justiﬁcation for MA must demonstrate
that there is not a mixing of “apples and oranges” (see
Petticrew and Roberts, 2006, pp. 203–208). After we com-
pleted our SR, we decided not to conduct a MA of the identi-
ﬁed studies, considering the advice from the research synthesis
literature and the large between-studies heterogeneity in terms
of research designs, independent variable constructs, and out-
comes, which will be evident in the next section. 133. FINDINGS
(a) Descriptive synthesis of the literature
The analyzed studies have been published mostly in refereed
journals (13 studies), but also in working papers series or as
conference presentations (6). All but one are available in
English. In the studies being synthesized there is a positive
association between studies’ quality—rated by the review
team—and publication in peer-reviewed journals, as well as
between study quality and the journals’ rank by impact factor.
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publication process can aﬀect speciﬁc ﬁelds diﬀerently. 14
While the majority of studies focus speciﬁcally on contract
enforcement (15), or on the broader concept of institutions
and investment (11), some evidence valuable to answer the
research question comes from studies that have slightly diﬀer-
ent foci. 15 The nature of the “innovations” for which
“impact” is sought greatly inﬂuences the nature and quality
of the evidence available, and therefore the inferences that
can be made and the conclusions that can be drawn. The stud-
ies that attempt to address the systematic review question are
all statistical analyses of non-experimental data, so the group
is mainly composed of study designs that cannot be conclusive
regarding causality.
Three studies use the same indirect measure of quality of
contract enforcement, including the early proponent of the
indicator (Clague, Keefer, Knack, & Olson, 1999). These stud-
ies measure quality of enforcement through the concept of
“contract-intensive money” (that is, the ratio of non-currency
money to the total money supply). They argue that “the same
governmental deﬁciencies that require self-enforcement of
transactions also lead economic actors to prefer currency”
(Clague et al., 1999, p. 188). While many of the studies raise
issues of validity of indicators, this is perhaps the measure of
contract enforcement that requires stronger “assumptions”
to be regarded as a valid construct.
A large proportion (15 of the 19 studies) use ratings or
reports of the quality of enforcement based in some way on
the views of experts and/or businessmen. These include studies
exploiting data generated by various World Bank-led initia-
tives on the business environment, as well as those exploiting
secondary data generated since the 1970s by investor advisory
companies such as International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
or Business Environment Risk Assessment (BERI), and the
Heritage Foundation (on the strengths and limitations of these
indicators, see Knack & Keefer, 1995; Williams & Siddique,
2008). A minority of studies chooses to elaborate more repli-
cable constructs. These include the study that actually records
legal innovations aﬀecting India’s states diﬀerently but simul-
taneously (Chemin, 2006), studies using the resulting ratings
from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2003) based on a cross country battery of indicators of litiga-
tion costs, and the studies mentioned that use a proxy based
on monetary aggregates.
The studies also vary in terms of the measure of investment
used. Twelve studies measure investment as the (net or gross)
addition to the stock of capital over GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) or over the stock of capital itself. One study measures
the level of investment in infrastructure. Three studies focus
on the eﬀects of contract enforcement on the investment in
R&D. Three studies use other indicators: investment as bino-
mial choices over a range of productive assets; value-added
elasticities of investment across industries; and the size of
ﬁrms’ inventories of ﬁnished products.
The choice of measures is not unrelated to the choice of unit
of analysis and methods. Notably, all included studies consid-
ered domestic investment of some kind as their outcome vari-
able, and none focused on foreign investment. This results
partly from the design decision to include FDI-related studies
if eﬀects on new/fresh/“greenﬁeld” investment could be dis-
cerned from those related to mergers or acquisitions that leave
the countries’ aggregate stock of capital unchanged.
Generally, a majority of the studies—and notably some of
those that rate highest in our quality appraisal scales—are
based on cross-section analyses with varying degrees of inge-
nuity and competence in the choice of variables, indicatorslag structures. The studies display no straightforward correla-
tion between tools of quantitative investigation and unit of
analysis.
Table 1 presents the primary studies organized according to
unit of analysis, structure of the datasets, and context of the
study. The small number of studies that are able or willing
to investigate longitudinal variations in data could anticipate
that the literature would be constrained in testing causal
hypotheses, given its general diﬃculty in observing “before–
after” variations.
As argued by some authors (e.g., Rodrik, 2005), even the
richest data sets available to test “institutions-performance”
hypotheses at the aggregate level are plagued with endogeneity
issues. Controlled trials, studies of natural experiments, or
instrumental variables estimations are the usual strategies for
causal inferences. Not surprisingly, our best quality studies
(in gray in Table 1) resort to the latter two strategies, but sev-
eral others fail to consider the endogeneity concerns and pro-
ceed (with few or no caveats) to use estimation methods that
cannot sustain a causal attribution.
This echoes the concerns of authors like Pande and Udry
(2006, chap. 14) that too much emphasis has been placed by
the “institutionalist” approach in analyzing cross-country
diﬀerences, to the detriment of other sources of institutional
variation that remain under-studied. Moreover, “insights” on
institutions and performance deduced from observed cross-
country variations may be vulnerable to the “ecological fal-
lacy,” so their translation into policy cannot be mechanical. 16
(b) Quality-weighted summary of ﬁndings
The main results and features of each of the nineteen
included studies are presented in Table 2. As discussed in
the previous section, study quality was rated for all identiﬁed
studies based on two complementary scales. In general, as
shown in (Aboal et al., 2012), the two quality indicators used
are strongly correlated but this still leaves room for individual
speciﬁcities that are worth looking at.
In this sectionwe start fromkey ﬁndings of the six best quality
items (summarizing them brieﬂy). 17Then, we examine whether
conclusions change when we include information from the next
best four studies. (In section (c) we consider the full set of pri-
mary studies, including low-quality ones, to explore patterns
in the studies’ context, hypothesized causal mechanisms and
observed outcomes (i.e., CMOs).
In addition to the treatment of endogeneity and causality,
the key ingredients in evaluating the quality of the studies were
the performance of robustness analyses of their results, and
the validity of the contract enforcement indicators used.
The six top-rated studies have made more or less successful
attempts to address in one way or another the issues of endo-
geneity and causality. Four of them have used instrumental
variable approaches (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Levine,
1998; Lin, Lin, & Song, 2010; Pang & Wu, 2009), one of them
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach (Chemin, 2006) and the
ﬁnal one exploits the time dimension to argue that the causal-
ity goes from contract enforcement to investment (Clague
et al., 1999). All of them have performed robustness tests,
either by introducing new variables in the regressions, by using
diﬀerent methods of estimation or by analyzing diﬀerent data
samples. The strength of the enforcement indicator (or its
“validity”) is variable across these studies. Chemin (2006)
exploits changes in the legislation, Clague et al. (1999), on
the other hand, use the “Contract Intensive Money” (CIM)
whose validity has been questioned. Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), Levine (1998), Pang and Wu (2009) employ indicators
Table 1. Studies by unit of analysis, structure of data and estimation method
Structure of 
data set - as 
used Unit of analysis
Countries Firms or industries
Study Context Effect Study Context Effect
Cross 
section
Acemoglu & 
Johnson 
(2005)
71 countries that are former European 
colonies. Economic performance measured 
ca. 1995 and averages over 1960 or 1970 to 
1995-98.
NS
Cungu & 
Swinnen 
(2003)
Hungary in transition (firms surveyed in 
1998). Agricultural enterprises that 
contract production to processing firms.
+ (ind) 
NS(dir)
Brunetti et al.
(1998)
52 countries, firm managers’ views on 
policies/institutions ca. 1996 and ten years 
earlier. Economic performance measured 
1970-92.
+ Raja & 
Schaefer 
(2007)
378 firm-level observations across 14 
comparable products and 39 developed and 
developing countries. Years covered are 
1997 to 2003.
+
Clague et al.
(1999)
95  developed and developing countries. 
Economic performance measured between 
1970 and 1990.
+ Long 
(2010)
1,500 Chinese firms from five cities, 2000. +
Commander 
& Tinn 
(2008)
It is not clear how many countries were 
included in the regressions. Data on contract 
enforcement for the year 2003.
(-)/NS Lin et al.
(2010)
Over 2,400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, 
2003.
+
Dao (2008) 36 developing countries, 2001-04. + Pang & Wu 
(2009) 
923 industry-country observations, for 
1963-2002. Developed and developing 
countries. Data on enforcement ranges 
from 1998-2007.
+
Levine 
(1998)
43 countries that were European colonies, 
1975-93.
+ 
(ind)
Chemin 
(2006)
Indian states around 2002. +
Banerjee et 
al. (2006)
40 developing economies, 1990-2000. NS
Time series Prados de la 
Escosura & 
Sanz-
Villarroya 
(2009)
Argentina over 1875-2000. +
Panel Acevedo & 
Mora-Mora 
(2009)
20 Latin American countries over 1995-2003. +
Alfranca & 
Huffman 
(2003)
Seven EU countries between 1984 and 1995. + (I)
Clarke 
(2001)
52 developed, middle- and low-income 
countries, 1983-1994.
+
Le (2004) 25 developing countries, 1975-1995. +
Poirson 
(1998)
53 developing countries, 1980-1995. NS
Notes: “Grayed” items are highest quality (see Section 2); ()/NS: two regressions yield NS coeﬃcients, one yields a signiﬁcant negative; +(ind): estimated
relationship is positive but indirect (through another intermediate outcome); +(I) positive eﬀect shows up only when contract enforcement is allowed to
interact with variable for eﬃciency of bureaucracy; (ind) = indirect eﬀect; (dir) = direct eﬀect.
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Table 2. Summary of papers’ ﬁndings
Authors Contract enforcement (CE)
indicator(s)
Investment indicator(s) CE variables’ sign (signs shown only if
signiﬁcant)a
Other results
(for at least one
of the CE
variables in
other
regressions)
Main conclusion
(according to authors
when available)c
Quality
assessment
Var. 1 Var. 2 Var. 3 WoE CI
Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005)
Legal formalism; Overall
procedural complexity; and
number of distinct procedures to
collect debt
Investment ratio to GDP NS NS NS - Contracting institutions
aﬀect the form of
ﬁnancial intermediation,
not investment (they are
superseded by property
right institutions)
med 3
Acevedo and
Mora Mora
(2009)
Judiciary ability to provide legal
support and protect private
property
Investment ratio to GDP + NS The variable judiciary is
positively correlated
with Investment/GDP
low 1
Alfranca and
Huﬀman (2003)
Relative degree to which
contractual agreements are
honored and complications
presented by language and
mentality diﬀerence
Aggregate private
investment in
agricultural R&D
+ Better contract
enforcement increases
aggregate private
agricultural R&D
investment
med/low 2
Banerjee et al.
(2006)
Rule of law indicator. ICRG Greenﬁeld infrastructure
investment
NS  Better contract
enforcement is not
correlated with
greenﬁeld investment in
infrastructure (reviewers’
conclusion)
low 1
Brunetti et al.
(1998)
Predictability of judiciary
enforcement
Annual average of
investment in percent of
GDP
+ Predictability of
judiciary enforcement is
positively correlated
with investment
med/low 1
Chemin (2006)b Count of amendments that
increase judiciary eﬃciency
Net addition to plant
and machinery assets.
Net addition to tools and
other ﬁxed assets. Net
addition to transport
and equipment assets
+
(for the
3 inv. var.)
A speedier judiciary
decreases the probability
of experiencing a breach
of contract and increases
the incentives to invest
high/med 3
Clague et al.
(1999)
Contract-intensive money Investment as a
percentage of GDP
+ CIM is positively related
to investment
med/low 3
Clarke (2001) Rule of law indicator Research and Develop.
Expenditure as% of
GDP
+ NS Countries with weaker
rule of law tend to have
lower R&D expenditures
low 1
Commander
and Tinn (2008)
Procedures/time/cost Gross ﬁxed capital
formation to GDP
 NS NS Investment is unrelated
to most Doing Business
indicators, while there is
a weak association with
procedures to deal with
licenses and contract
enforcement
med/low 1
(continued on next page)
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Cungu and
Swinnen (2003)
Ineﬀective court enforcement of
contracts
Flow of gross capital
investment as a% of
gross capital stock
 indirect eﬀect,
NS direct eﬀect
Ineﬀective contract
enforcement positively
aﬀects delayed
payments. Contract
breaches, in the form of
delayed payments, have
a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on investment level
med/low 2
Dao (2008) Courts constraint (are courts a
major or very severe constraint to
CE)
Share of gross capital
formation to GDP.
 Courts constraints
linearly aﬀect the share
of gross capital
formation to GDP of
developing countries
low 1
Le (2004) Contract-intensive money.
Variability of contract-intensive
money
Private investment as a
percentage of GDP
+ + Contract enforcement
and its variability are
positively correlated
with investment
low 1
Levine (1998) ENFORCE (eﬃciency of legal
system)
Per capita capital stock
growth
+ The data indicate a close
relationship between the
legal system and banking
development, and
between banking
development and capital
stock growth
med/low 3
Lin et al. (2010) Contract (whether a ﬁrm usually
signs written contracts with its
clients) Contracts upheld?
(managers opinion)
R&D spending as a
percentage of sales)
+ + Contract enforcement
plays an essential role in
promoting corporate
R&D
med/low 3
Long (2010) Quality of local courts. Quality
of non-local courts
Investment rate + + Higher proportions of
business disputes settled
through the courts
system is correlated with
a higher investment rate
med/low 2
Pang and Wu
(2009)c
Interaction of Contract intensity
with an index of the quality of
contract enforcement and courts,
and two additional indicators of
legal quality
Industrial investment
elasticity to value added
+ + + NS Countries with better
contract enforcement
tend to have more
eﬃcient capital
allocation in industries
which are more contract-
intensive
med 3
Poirson (1998) Rule of law indicator Nominal private ﬁxed
investment in percentage
of nominal GDP
NS Once civil liberties, the
quality of the
bureaucracy, and the
risk of expropriation are
controlled for in the
regression, rule of law
became NOT signiﬁcant
med/low 1
(continued on next page)
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et al. (2010) make use of business survey data. None of them
discusses in much detail the adequacy of the chosen contract
enforcement indicator in the speciﬁc development and insti-
tutional context of the studied regions.
Regarding themain results, Chemin (2006) examined India’s
experience around the 2002 enactment of theCode ofCivil Pro-
cedureAmendmentAct, to assess the net impact of theAct tak-
ing into account the fact that some states hadalready enacted in
previous years some of the amendments adopted nationally in
2002. This is the only study to examine eﬀects of an actual
reform episode; ﬁrm-level data, combined with sub national
variation in legislation, and a nationwide reform allow the
author todraw strong conclusions (basedonadiﬀerence-in-dif-
ferences approach) that we found persuasive.
The study shows that the legal reform (the degree to which
it changed legal processes at state and national levels)
impacted positively on small ﬁrms’ decisions to invest in a
variety of ﬁxed assets. The evidence shown in the paper sup-
ports the view that the decision to invest is favored by fewer
breaches of contracts, greater access to credit, and thicker
rental markets, that result from a speedier judiciary. These
results would count as a “positive” for the eﬀect of contract
enforcement on investment, besides the additional light on
causal chains.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) used a cross section of
countries that were once European colonies, to unpack the
concept of growth and investment-friendly institutions, dis-
tinguishing between property rights and contracting institu-
tions. They ﬁnd evidence that variation in contracting
institutions has an impact on the structure of ﬁnancing,
but does not seem to have a direct eﬀect on investment rates.
Their instrumental variables approach addresses endogene-
ity issues: they proxy some of the contemporary institutional
variables by correlated but unequivocally preceding vari-
ables (e.g., English legal origin, settler mortality, population
density circa 1,500), controlling for the possible reverse-cau-
sality bias. Their samples are sometimes very small (for
example, in looking at the stability of ﬁndings for sub-sam-
ples). Their results would count as a “negative” for the
review question.
Pang and Wu (2009) looked at the eﬀect on the allocation
of capital to more or less eﬃcient industries. The article
sheds light on the direct eﬀect of contract enforcement on
the rate of capital accumulation by industries. As the previ-
ous study discussed, it is generous in its testing for alterna-
tive speciﬁcations, discussing indicators and endogeneity,
and using instrumental variables techniques to sidestep that
trap. Like Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) it also takes advan-
tage of the Djankov et al.’s data on procedural complexity,
and has a large sample of industries-countries-years.
The study argues persuasively that better enforcement of
contracts is associated positively with more eﬃcient alloca-
tion of capital, understood as investment going to industries
with greater growth potential (measured by the elasticity of
investment to value added). The authors also show that the
observed eﬀect is more pronounced in industries which are
more contract-intensive. This study also counts as a
“positive” since the outcome (the investment distribution
by industry) implies changes in investment levels by industry
linked to their exposure to contract uncertainty. As a by-
product, investment’s responsiveness to growth would rein-
force the well-established “accelerator” eﬀect (that is, output
growth’s positive eﬀect on investment).
Clague et al. (1999) are much more direct. Their approach
is to create the above-mentioned indirect proxy for eﬀective-
Beer ﬁnancial infrastructure and access to formal ﬁnancial instuons
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Chemin, 2007; Levine, 1998)
Reduce 
speciﬁc 
uncertainty
Decrease downside uncertainty on the return to investment (Poirson, 1998; Lin et al., 
2010)
Reduce policy uncertainty (Le, 2004)
Reduce probability of experiencing shortage of capital (Chemin, 2006)
Reduce probability of a breach of contract and hold up (Clarke, 2001; Chemin, 2006; Clague 
et al., 1999; Cungu & Swinnen, 2003; Raja & Schaefer, 2007)
Increase expected returns (Alfranca & Huﬀman, 2003)
Facilitates operaons and more complex transacons (Long, 2010, Lin et al., 2010)
More eﬃcient capital allocaon: reduce capital adjustment costs (Pang & Wu, 2009)
Reduce size of raw and ﬁnished goods inventories (Raja & Schaefer, 2007)
Raise expected
returns
Reduce general uncertainty (not precisely deﬁned) (Acevedo & Mora Mora, 2009; 
Alfranca & Huﬀman, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2006; Brune et al., 1998; Dao, 2008; 
Prados de la Escosura & Sanz-Villarroya, 2009)
Beer contract 
enforcement
Figure 3. Mechanisms through which contract enforcement would aﬀect investment, according to the included primary studies.
332 WORLD DEVELOPMENTness of contract enforcement. If the proxy is considered valid,
then it is possible to look at the relations of interest from a
long-term, dynamic perspective (see, e.g., Prados de la
Escosura & Sanz-Villarroya, 2009). However, they use time
variations only for a few speciﬁc countries, and just to justify
the choice of indicator by inspecting its behavior during salient
macroeconomic events. When it comes to the statistical anal-
ysis, they work with averages to run cross-section regressions.
Their discussion of the indicator’s correlation with other mea-
sures, of whether the indicator captures what it is asked to,
and the inclusion of some sensitivity analyses, adds to the
credibility of the story. Regarding the review question, they
claim to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence of a positive
eﬀect of contract enforceability on investment ratios, so their
results count as a “positive.” They are among the few that
run separate estimations for developed and developing coun-
tries, suggesting that they may recognize contexts as condi-
tioning the notion and nature of enforcement.
Levine (1998) is mostly concerned with the eﬀect of institu-
tions on ﬁnancial development and growth. A carefully crafted
study, it digs deeper into the ﬁnancial development-growth
link than into the contract enforcement-investment one.
Regarding the former, the study can be read as demonstrating
that ﬁnancial development matters for growth of the capital
stock, and the latter is partly explained by enforcement of con-
tracts (proxied by a composite index of rule of law and risk of
conﬁscation). The study uses instrumental variables and a
cross-section sample. His results would count as “positive”
for an indirect eﬀect of contract enforcement on investment
through ﬁnancial development.
Finally, the last top-rated study (Lin et al., 2010) examines
the eﬀects of contract enforcement on corporate R&D in a
sample of 2,400 ﬁrms of 18 Chinese cities. Given the potential
endogeneity of the quality of enforcement variables (measureof managers’ faith that their rights will be protected by the
contract and upheld by the legal system) the authors use the
industry-location average of these variables as instruments.
The evidence presented in the study shows that contract
enforcement plays an important (positive) explanatory role
both in the decision to invest in R&D and in the amount
invested in R&D by ﬁrms; therefore this study counts as a
“positive.”
In brief, the six best-rated studies suggest that (i) contract
enforcement aﬀects investment directly, (ii) it probably matters
also indirectly through development of ﬁnancial markets and
facilitating the access to resources of more investment-eﬃcient
industries, and (iii) it may augment the accelerator eﬀect (i.e.,
growth’s entrance among the factors explaining investment).
More speciﬁcally, at least in one major developing country
(India), there seems to be evidence that relevant enforcement
deﬁcits have to do with the length of processes, which might
create incentives to breach contracts and to prevent available
funds from entering the circuit that leads to investment. That
said, the heterogeneity of methods and ﬁndings, the ambigui-
ties intrinsic in cross-country evidence, and the limited feasible
treatment of endogeneity, would prevent an impartial reader
from drawing strong conclusions, even from the best primary
studies in the review.
When we add into the picture the four studies rated “2” in
the CI scale (the causal inference) and “med/low” in WoE
(the overall strength of the study) the between-studies hetero-
geneity is greater than before. A “vote count” shows that three
of the additional four studies ﬁnd that better contract enforce-
ment is positively associated with higher levels of investment,
with one of them focused only on R&D investments. The
remaining study ﬁnds a positive indirect eﬀect of enforcement
on investment, through less breaches of contract. The contract
enforcement and breach of contract indicators in this study are
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTMENT: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 333all based on ﬁrm managers’ perceptions recorded through sur-
veys.
In general, these studies cannot go beyond detecting correla-
tions between the enforcement proxy and the investment indi-
cator. In fact, in some cases there is the very credible
possibility of reverse causality. 18 Additionally, most of these
studies do not perform any robustness checks (Long, 2010,
is an exception). Like the top rated, they barely discuss the
validity of the contract enforcement construct.
(c) Synthesis of context-mechanisms-outcomes
Leaving aside their weaknesses as attempts to substantiate
causal claims, the studies in the second- and third-quality cat-
egories—like those in the ﬁrst—can still be informative about
the mechanisms thought to bring about the enforcement-
investment empirical relationship. The map of “mechanisms”
resulting from the whole set of studies does not exhaust the
pool of hypotheses about how the eﬀect is caused, since we
excluded from the selection those research outputs that were
only theoretical and those that were on related topics but
did not contain an explicit test of the enforcement-investment
link.
Among the included studies, almost all implicitly or explic-
itly adhere to a basic story stating that eﬀective third-party
enforcement enables more complex contracting, and that con-
tract uncertainty will tend to depress investment by aﬀecting
expected returns, increasing investment costs, restricting
access to key resources, or making some complex transactions
plainly unfeasible. Unfortunately, several studies are not expli-
cit about the causal pathways presumed to exist behind their
speciﬁc empirical work. At least ﬁve studies (Acevedo &
Mora Mora, 2009; Banerjee, Oetzel, & Ranganathan, 2006;
Brunetti et al., 1998; Commander & Tinn, 2008; Dao, 2008)
jump quickly from cursory remarks about a link between insti-
tutional uncertainty and investment to the analysis of the data
(more on this below).
Among the rest, there are those studies that elaborate
slightly on the assumed mechanisms. In various cases the elab-
oration is meant to justify the focus on some speciﬁc compo-
nent of overall capital accumulation (e.g., investments in
R&D in Alfranca & Huﬀman, 2003; Clarke, 2001; Lin et al.,
2010; or accumulation of inventories in Raja & Schaefer,
2007). In other cases, conceptual elaboration seems to justify
a speciﬁc form of causal pathway for which the authors want
to provide empirical support. In Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), (better) contracting institutions are shown to have an
eﬀect on (a more developed) ﬁnancial structure, which implies
(greater) availability of funds for investments. In Cungu and
Swinnen (2003), better contract enforcement seems to reduce
delayed payments, which in turn have negative eﬀect on invest-
ment. Lastly, the results in Alfranca and Huﬀman (2003) sug-
gest that a worse contracting environment does not always
inhibit R&D investments, but it does when it coincides with
a relatively ineﬃcient bureaucracy; which makes it the only
study to propose a conditional cause–eﬀect association. In gen-
eral, all the studies so far lack an explicit analytical model.
Some of the CMO schemes that seem free from ad-hoc the-
orizing include, ﬁrst, those building on the analytics of the
“hold-up problem” (originating in work by Oliver Williamson,
and Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Almen Alchian, in
the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed in Cungu & Swinnen, 2003).
In that framework weak enforcement encourages hold-up
strategies (such as delayed payments to suppliers or delayed
delivery to buyers), that aﬀect investments through their
impact on cash ﬂows and indirectly through greater downwarduncertainty of returns. The mechanism at work results from
the existence of commitments, on which parties to a contract
rely for their business operations, and the power bestowed
on another party to renege. Contract breaches would be facil-
itated by greater cost of capital (that makes it costlier to shift
to other business partnerships in the short and medium term)
or lower cost of non-compliance (due to enforcement imper-
fections). The study that highlights hold-up-related mecha-
nisms comes from a transition economy, and the authors
base the relevance of the problem on that context, but there
is no claim that it might not be relevant in other societies. 19
Another non-trivial mechanism operates through better
enforcement reducing capital adjustment costs, facilitating
the process by which funding reaches more eﬃcient industries.
Citing a similar origin in the institutional economics of Wil-
liamson and others (acknowledging more recently Grossman,
Hart, Moore, Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman), the study by
Pang and Wu (2009) explores a channel from incomplete con-
tracts to capital misallocation that operates through imperfect
contract enforcement rather than through ﬁnancial system eﬃ-
ciency. It is argued that the sectoral distribution of investment
will reﬂect a bias against more eﬃcient industries when con-
tract enforcement is weak(er), particularly if eﬃcient industries
are highly “contract dependent.”
Figure 3 identiﬁes other mechanisms discussed in the synthe-
sized literature, including better known ones such as those
involving costs and speed of dispute settlement, access to fund-
ing (operating through formal ﬁnancial institutions and other
sources of funds), and proﬁtability or corresponding risks.
From confronting the enumeration of presumed causal
mechanisms (Figure 3) with the map of related literatures
sketched above (Figure 1) it appears that empirical work on
the contract enforcement–investment link has been mostly
informed by basic analytics of capital accumulation and is
disconnected or weakly linked to other areas of the “institu-
tions-performance” ﬁeld. Only those studies that refer to the
eﬀects of enforcement on investment through ﬁnancial depth
(top box in Figure 3), which reﬂect the inﬂuence of the Law
and Finance literature; or those highlighting the hold-up
problem, which are applications of the economic theory of
incomplete contracts, seem rooted in theories beyond basic
economics.
Perhaps the limited attention to theory in the reviewed liter-
ature helps explain the dearth of conceptual discussion on the
applicability of frameworks, deﬁnitions, and measures to
heterogeneous samples of countries and times. In fact, the evi-
dence analyzed largely comes from developed and developing
countries over the last third of the 20th century, though a few
examine 21st century cases and data. Many studies work with
heterogeneous samples of countries (presumably to buy power
for the statistical tests), and generally tend to oﬀer limited dis-
cussion of uneven levels of development and institutional
sophistication. The distribution of studies by sample coverage
(8 focused on sets of developing countries, 7 mixing develop-
ing and developed, 3 studying transition economies, and one
on European countries) would not be an obstacle per se for
exploring context-contingent theories. The limited attention
to varieties of contexts and validity of indicators across classes
of countries would rather seem a manifestation of weak link-
ages of empirics with theory in the sub-ﬁeld.
As part of the context of almost all the studies (by design as
well as by data availability), countries are portrayed as
experiencing more or less gradual changes in their institutional
landscape, and these in turn are expected to have some eﬀect
over aggregate economic outcomes (with various confounding
factors that are partially controlled for). As discussed below,
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authors in the ﬁeld see as problematic.
(d) General remarks
Before moving to the conclusions and implications, there are
a few additional observations worth making, on the review’s
results and the relationships between theories, explanation,
and empirics.
First, the work reviewed tends to take a bird’s eye perspec-
tive on the analyzed phenomena, often missing detailed char-
acterizations of speciﬁc institutions, their composite
architecture, their mechanics in interaction with their contexts,
and their outcomes. The bird’s eye perspective was predictable
in studies of countries as units of analysis, but it is also present
in the literature based on ﬁrms’ or ﬁrm managers’ reports, and
could be one reason why several heterogeneous constructs for
contract enforcement are allowed to co-exist. 20 The scarce
conceptualization complicates theory testing and undermines
theory selection, eroding the usefulness of empirical ﬁndings
for policy design.
Several simpliﬁcations, and claimed political neutrality, are
the bases of what is known as the “endowment perspective
(on the law and development),” which has a major inﬂuence
in the institutional economics literature despite demonstra-
tions of its faults (Milhaupt & Pistor, 2008). 21 The endow-
ment view would see norms as building blocks, legal regimes
as stocks of rules that can be easily reorganized, and both as
essentially exogenous to the economic process. Such view
has been related to multilateral reform agendas for developing
and transition countries, and it does not seem inappropriate to
assert that it provides the implicit conceptual background for
most of the papers in our review.
Legal (sometimes called institutional) “reform” has speciﬁc
meaning in that perspective: assuming a dominant inﬂuence
of written norms and formal contracts over behaviors, reforms
would consist of adding, removing, or modifying statutory
provisions, or designing better contracts. This could account
for some naivete´ regarding measurement of quality of enforce-
ment (which would just result from more stringent norms and/
or more intense policing) and the unfounded preference for
cross-country studies.
Based on the ﬁndings so far, one might be tempted to
conclude that institutional change that fosters reliability of
contracts (in some sense) will be rewarded with greater
additions to a society’s stock of capital. Fifteen of the 19
synthesized studies ﬁnd a positive association between the con-
struct for institutional variation and the capital accumulation
variables, and the proportion is about the same when only the
strongest studies are considered. Such general conclusion
without qualiﬁcations is probably what policy makers (some
being sponsors, in one way or another, of a good part of this
literature) take away from casual observation of research from
the last couple of decades.
The conclusion might have been reinforced by researchers’
tendency to conﬂate contracting institutions with institutions
more speciﬁcally related to the protection of property rights,
or to place them all under the larger umbrella of the “rule of
law.” Two of the 19 studies in the SR (Acevedo & Mora
Mora, 2009; Raja & Schaefer, 2007) actually use as proxies
of “contract enforcement” some indicators that are explicitly
about the protection of property rights; three more studies
use ratings of countries with respect to the rule of law
(Banerjee et al., 2006; Clarke, 2001; Poirson, 1998), and one
study (Levine, 1998) uses a combined index of both. These
studies’ approach may be quite misleading, particularly whenproxies start to be confused with the thing they are supposed
to represent.
The suspicion of publication bias in this literature is justiﬁ-
able and nurtured by the observation that those few studies
that do not ﬁnd a “positive” are presented in a way that makes
the null the expected result (e.g., Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005),
or have a broader focus beyond eﬀects of contract enforce-
ment (Banerjee et al., 2006; Poirson, 1998). Moreover, in these
cases the ambiguous or negative result are largely inferred by
us, the reviewers, and not recognized by the authors. With this
in mind, the above-mentioned results of “vote counting”
(quality-weighted or not) have to be taken with a grain of salt.4. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The systematic review reveals that the evidence on the
impact of improvements in contract enforcement on invest-
ment is spotty, comes from a rather disjoint body of literature
and generally does not meet accepted standards for causal
inference; only in roughly one third of the studies does it meet
weaker though defensible standards for non-experimental
data. The literature is thin, there are important ambiguities
associated with the most widely used indicators of institutional
change, there is a paucity of studies designed to address a
“cause-and-eﬀect” question, and there are symptoms of publi-
cation bias. In many studies, the analytical approach is gener-
ally sound but the available indicator of quality of
enforcement or breach of contracts has questionable validity.
A signiﬁcant number of studies are also of low quality due
to their publication of a few “statistically signiﬁcant” results
without robustness analyses. For policy makers and donor
agencies, it seems that too much conﬁdence has been put on
a plausible but unproven causal hypothesis.
Some of the hypothesized mechanisms through which
enforcement of contracts might aﬀect investment seem consis-
tent with available evidence (for example, the causal channel
through breaches of contract and their eﬀect on the value of
investment projects). However, much remains to be done for
research to be able to justify speciﬁc policy interventions. It
is unfortunate that only a few studies rely on indicators of var-
iation in enforcement that minimize the inﬂuence on measure-
ment of subjective judgments, since these could be biased in
ways that obscure the studies’ policy implications.
The empirical literature reviewed largely embraces the
“endowment perspective” in law and development, and is
strikingly disconnected from more elaborate conceptions of
contracts and enforcement (see, e.g., Berkowitz et al., 2003;
Spamann, 2009; recall Macaulay, 1963). Such disconnect sug-
gests that there are enduring barriers between disciplines—
particularly between law, sociology, and economics—that
may be hindering the literature’s growth. Inter-disciplinary
dialog could result in improved conceptual frameworks, deﬁ-
nitions, and measures of relevant variables, and this could
motivate original empirical work.
Improving contract enforcement could be a valuable objec-
tive in itself, to the extent that it is associated with fairness and
the equality of citizens before the law. Quite another thing is to
advocate institutional reforms that will demand investment of
political capital and other resources, to improve the expedi-
ency and predictability of judicial rulings in the name of broad
economic beneﬁts that are not yet proven to exist. Moreover,
even if the institutional constructs and inference strategies
were sound, there may be other conceptual failings in the liter-
ature to be considered before pushing a reform agenda for all
or speciﬁc groups of countries. In fact, it may occur that the
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niently manipulated by altering speciﬁc legal statutes, or with-
out considering the process of their adoption, or ignoring the
political context.
As pointed out by Berkowitz et al. (2003, p. 164) in the last
three decades
“many countries borrowed from diﬀerent legal systems, not
infrequently in an attempt to signal to foreign investors
from diﬀerent countries that they comply with their domes-
tic legal standards. . . . Yet, the results of these eﬀorts have
been mixed”.
The entanglement of norm and enforcement, the neglect of
transplantation problems, and insuﬃcient attention to poli-
tics-law interactions may explain a good part of the outcome,
which has led the Independent Panel (2013, p. 1–2) reviewing
the Doing Business report to warn that it
“should not be viewed as providing a one-size-ﬁts-all tem-
plate for development. Empirical evidence on the results
of business-regulation reforms captured by the report is
mixed and suggestive at best. . . . The evidence in favor of
speciﬁc country reforms is contingent on many auxiliary
factors not captured by Doing Business report topics”.
If evidence is to guide policy, more research needs to be sup-
ported on the causal links, and more of it should follow a fal-
siﬁcationist program; that is, should expose the extant
hypotheses to stringent empirical tests, seeking to weed-out
those more frequently refuted and expanding knowledge by
building on the more resilient ones (Popper, 2004; Hands,
2001). 22 Yet, the epistemological considerations should not
stop there. Two observed patterns raise important issues in
that regard: the “estimation without (or with implicit) theory,”
and the “proliferating mechanisms” process. The ﬁrst refers to
the observation that several studies omit an explicit analytical
framework and, after superﬁcial remarks stating expected
results, jump to the empirical tests of a set of hypotheses. This
could be cataloged as naı¨f empiricism. Indeed, the statistical
testing without a theoretical framework implicitly and mistak-
enly assumes that data will speak for itself, and deprives the
analyst of explanations that are essential to deriving policy
advice.
The second pattern—mechanism proliferation—is logically
consistent with what could be called “inconsistent instrumen-
talism” or “unacknowledged realism” in economics (see
Fleetwood, 2001). Such position results from the tensions
between an intended empiricist/instrumentalist rhetoric and
a practice that implicitly recognizes the existence of unobserv-
ables and the “capacities” of inanimate things, relying on
“mechanisms” as the way of explaining (Lawson, 2001;
Hands, 2001). From the latter’s angle, developing interpretive
mechanisms that accommodate empirical regularities is the
way to explaining, and therefore mechanism-development
results in a proliferation of observationally equivalent expla-
nations. One could note that our own approach (that is, thatof SRs and “realist synthesis”) reﬂects a similar epistemology
(the attention to CMOs is typical “realist synthesis” and in line
with realism in economics). This shows how observations from
SRs can provide the motivation and starting point for greater
methodological self-consciousness, with interesting prospects
for applied research.
Looking into the future, the research agenda will require a
rebalancing. While the literature reviewed seems to support
the conventional assumption, it is not yet clear if observed reg-
ularities are robust across various samples (for time spans,
country categories, data structures, etc.). In particular, testing
for the stability of econometric estimates across meaningful
groups of countries, such as cultural or legal communities,
would go beyond testing for robustness and could shed light
on the contingent relevance of the institutions-performance
hypotheses. As we saw, primary studies manipulating cross-
country samples were largely shy about that possibility,
despite its economic and social signiﬁcance.
While there may be ways of improving the overall robust-
ness of cross-country panel analyses (and the development
of new indicators of countries’ institutional attributes will con-
tinue stimulating that “industry”), panels of sub national juris-
dictions and/or ﬁrms would seem to carry more promise in
terms of uncovering causal mechanisms, as they make it easier
to control for key unobserved heterogeneities. They will com-
prise those studies that can exploit a natural experiment, and
those taking advantage of spatial or temporal variation in
agents’ exposure to institutional arrangements (Pande &
Udry, 2006, chap. 14). The use of theory-based approaches,
measuring the impact on intermediate outcomes along the
causal chain would also shed light on the channels of transmis-
sion. A focus on actual reform episodes and creative research
designs will take the literature several steps farther. In general,
robust evidence will come from studies based on an explicit
theory and with credible identiﬁcation strategies (good exam-
ples are Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, & Visaria, 2012; Visaria,
2009).
More research is needed on the response to institutional
innovations of ﬁrms, bureaucrats, and other “micro” agents
(e.g., banks) that might be involved in the link through some
direct or indirect channel. Research will add light by exploring
untapped datasets (e.g., records from, and statistics on judicial
systems or their components, etc.), and by reporting more of
the actual action in the oﬃces (e.g., results of robustness tests
and/or other omitted analyses that might reveal something
about robustness). For studies based on macro data and
instrumental variables, credibility could be strengthened by
heeding the advice of Bazzi and Clemens (2013) about basing
decisions on theory and serious scrutiny of construct validity.
Research could also use qualitative methods and draw infor-
mation from suitably designed consultation with business peo-
ple and government oﬃcials. Being close to the institutional
“action” may allow researchers to seize scarce opportunities
to advance knowledge through suitably designed programs.NOTES1. Some regulatory norms are policies rather than institutions, though
still “rules of the game;” we acknowledge this limitation of the diagram
but leave aside ﬁner distinctions in the interest of space.
2. Our research question was “What is the evidence of the impact on
investment rates of reforms to improve the enforcement of contracts?”3. On the history and factors driving the development of research
synthesis as a ﬁeld, see Chalmers, Hedges, and Cooper (2002).
4. The typical literature review in the Journal of Economic Literature or
the Journal of Economic Surveys, for example, fail to describe how the
included references were identiﬁed and chosen (i.e., they are normally not
336 WORLD DEVELOPMENTreplicable and it is hard for readers to tell if the conclusions are a balanced
representation of the whole ﬁeld or could be biased in some known or
unknown way).
5. This journal recently published a SR on another relevant impact
question (Van Rooyen, Stewart, & De Wet, 2012, on impacts of
microﬁnance).
6. Other key determinants of investment include access to funds and the
cost of borrowing, taxes, and public expenditures (public and private
investment have been found to be complementary or substitutes, depend-
ing on various circumstances), and the size of the market as determined,
for example, by trade policies.
7. http://www.dbrpanel.org/ Accessed January 29, 2014.
8. http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/contract-law-
enforcement-cle-program Accessed: January 29, 2014.
9. Our SR provides a telling example of the problems of focusing only on
published work: the best quality-rated study (Chemin, 2006) was only
accessible to us in working paper format. While an exclusionary reviewer
might have left it outside the relevant sample of studies, covering the gray
literature allowed us to catch what would be published some years later
(Chemin, 2012).
10. SRs are notoriously labor-intensive. A study that explores two or
three levels in an ordinarily complex causal framework, for relatively
focused review questions, may easily involve half a dozen authors or more
(see e.g., Tripney et al., 2009).
11. Alfranca andHuﬀman (2001, 2003) are the ﬁrst set of related studies and
Gow and Swinnen (2002), Cungu and Swinnen (2003), and Cungu, Gow,
Swinnen, and Vranken (2008) are the second. We “represent” the ﬁrst pair
with the most recent (Alfranca&Huﬀman, 2003), and the second group with
what we considered to be the best quality report (Cungu & Swinnen, 2003).
12. Further details are explained in (Aboal et al., 2012).
13. Given the number of primary studies, the use of statistical methods to
synthesize quantitative ﬁndings would require using more than one
estimate per study so as to increase the sample size, a procedure that is not
peacefully accepted in the synthesis literature (Becker, Hedges, & Pigott,
2004). Also, good portions of the relevant professional community
advocate the assessment of the studies’ “quality of execution” before
deciding to include them in a statistical synthesis (Gough, 2007), a
recommendation that would aggravate the sample size issues in our case.
14. Four out of six studies in the top-quality class (ﬁve in six, if Chemin,
2012, post-cut-oﬀ date publication is counted) were available in journals
between ranks 52 and 5, and all four in the next quality class were
available in journals ranked 44 to 401 in RePEc’s 10-year impact ranking,at the same time that only four in nine studies in the third and last class
had been published in professional journals ranked 32 to 434. In brief,
publication is more frequent and outlets’ impacts greater for better quality
studies. Neither publication source nor its rank was considered relevant
when we rated study quality. (RePEc’s journal ranking is available at
http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.recurse.html; consulted on
January 19, 2014.)
15. The numbers do not add up to 19 because more than one focal theme
was recorded for some studies.
16. We refer to the “ecological fallacy” as the logical ﬂaw of generalizing
about individuals what has actually been observed at some higher level of
aggregation (e.g., geographic units).
17. The initial focus of the synthesis is on six studies that attained at least
a “med/low” rating in the summary dimension of the WoE tool, and a
rating of 3 in the CI scale. That is followed by observation of change and
similarity of the conclusion when studies that also have a “med/low”
rating in WoE but a rating of 2 in the CI scale are added.
18. Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1998) run a regression of the average
investment rate in the period 1970–92 (alternatively 1980–92) on a
measure of contract enforcement in the year 1996.
19. In a study that was eventually removed from the ﬁnal set due to
exclusion criteria on the outcome variable, the transition or hybrid
economy context drives an opposing hypothesis consistent with some
evidence: Feng Lu and Yao (2009) examine the possibility that enhanced
legal enforcement in a transition economy with ﬁnancial repression may
limit capital available to the private sector (which comes from “leakage”
from the state-owned enterprises), and thus depress private investment.
20. For example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and, say, Brunetti et al.
(1998), share the same “bird’s eye” approach, even when the former use
the Djankov et al. (2003) indices of legal formalism constructed from
lawyers’ assessments of how the law in a country deals with some business
cases and the latter is based on ﬁrm managers’ responses on dimensions of
credibility and predictability of the global legal and law-making systems.
21. The “endowment perspective on the law and development” must not be
confused with the theories of development that recognize a key role to
natural resource endowments. Since major strands within the latter
recognize institutions as the variable(s) mediating the eﬀects of resource
endowments on economic performance, confusion is not only possible but
likely.
22. Hands (2001), especially Section 7.1, provides thorough discussion
and extensive references to the literature on strengths/weaknesses of
varieties of falsiﬁcationism, as well as their successive transformation and
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